I. INTRODUCTION
In America, few things evoke more political controversy than guns, and as with many contentious public policy issues, participants in the American gun debate tend to polarize into two camps. 1 Advocates of stricter regulations claim that high rates of gun ownership cause increases in violent crime and that allowing even law-abiding adults to carry firearms in public results in a net loss to public safety. 2 Proponents of more permissive gun laws disagree, arguing that lawful gun ownership and possession deter crime and that the primary effect of restrictions on the carry of firearms is to disarm the law-abiding and make them more vulnerable to attack by the violent. 3 This debate gained considerable attention during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when many states began to enact more permissive concealed carry laws, 4 and it intensified in recent years as the country witnessed several high-profile mass shootings. 5 In the wake of these tragedies, discussion has often centered on the topic of so-called "gun-free zones"-places where persons other than sworn law enforcement officers are prohibited from carrying firearms, even if they are law-abiding adults and possess a concealed-weapons § 45-8-321 (2011) , available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/serial-murder/serialmurder-july-2008-pdf ("Generally, mass murder was described as a number of murders (four or more) occurring during the same incident, with no distinctive time period between the murders.") (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
permit. 6 Supporters of gun-free zones argue that certain locations are especially sensitive, either because of the people or the activities they host, and that allowing the general public to carry firearms in those locations would cause an especially great threat to public safety. 7 Gun-rights proponents take exactly the opposite view, contending that gun-free zones actually attract violent crime (and especially mass killings) because violent criminals and grievance killers are undeterred by laws forbidding the carry of firearms and prefer unarmed targets when looking to carry out their sinister plots. 8 The pro-carry movement has gained traction in several states, leading to the legalization of concealed carry on college campuses and by teachers and administrators in primary and secondary schools. 9 When the Supreme Court invalidated Washington, D.C.'s restrictive gun laws six years ago in District of Columbia v. Heller, 10 it signaled an intention to leave at least a portion of the debate over gunfree zones to the political process. In a now familiar passage, the Court stressed that while the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms, the Court's decision should not "be taken to cast doubt on . . . laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings . . . ." 11 The Court strongly suggested that the right to bear arms extends beyond 6 . Even states with liberalized carry laws often prohibit those outside law enforcement from carrying firearms in certain locations, such as primary and secondary schools, university campuses, sports stadiums, courthouses, bars, and police stations. For a compilation of such laws, see HANDGUNLAW.US, http://www.handgun law.us/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2013 the home, 12 but it nevertheless reaffirmed the presumptive validity of gun-free zones in "sensitive places" two years later when it incorporated the Second Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago. 13 The Court's brief references to gun-free zones remain somewhat of a mystery. In neither Heller nor McDonald did the Court offer much explanation for its dicta, aside from the casual observations that gunfree zones in certain places are "longstanding" and have "historical justifications." 14 Perhaps the strongest clue lies in the decisional method of both opinions, which focused almost entirely on how the public likely understood the Second and Fourteenth Amendments when they were ratified in 1791 and 1868. 15 To date, however, the Supreme Court has offered no further guidance on the precise scope of the right to keep and bear arms, and lower courts have begun to fill the void. 16 This Article focuses on Heller's enumerated sensitive places-"schools" and "government buildings"-and begins with the premise that these terms allow some room for interpretation. In affirming the likely constitutionality of laws prohibiting the carrying of firearms in schools, did the Court intend to leave undisturbed gun bans in primary and secondary schools only or also on university campuses? In its reference to government buildings, did the Court mean to suggest that the government may act with impunity whenever it bans the carry of firearms on its property, or are there some types of public property-particularly national parks and remote lands home to dangerous wildlife-where a combination of low security risks and historical practices limits the government's authority as property owner?
This Article further assumes that the historical record will not fully resolve these interpretive issues. Indeed, as several commentators have noted, the historical pedigree of even Heller's most noncontroversial "presumptively lawful" regulations-"prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons" 17 -can fairly be disputed. 18 involve questions about its limits as a tool for adjudication" and has described originalism's "three main difficulties" as follows: First, it is sometimes hard to find adequate objective evidence of how the Constitution's text would have been understood by the relevant audience at the time of adoption. Second, it is sometimes difficult to know how the commands in the text should be applied, consistent with its original meaning, to particular circumstances that the enacting public did not consider, and often could not have foreseen. Third, courts will inevitably make some decisions based on mistaken interpretations of the Constitution, and later courts will have to decide how much deference to give these precedents. number of well-defined exceptions in an effort to preserve the broad scope of the guarantee as it was understood by the ratifying public. It should be the same with Heller's sensitive places exception to the Second Amendment right of armed self-defense outside the home.
Finally, Part V demonstrates how broad themes from existing First Amendment doctrines support a restrained interpretation of even Heller's enumerated sensitive places-schools and government buildings. Specifically, Part V argues that student speech cases observe a line between the First Amendment rights of secondary and post-secondary students, and these cases indicate that college campuses generally are less sensitive than primary and secondary school classrooms. Courts therefore should not interpret Heller's schools to encompass college campuses. Furthermore, Part V argues that, as with First Amendment forum doctrine, the scope of the government's authority to regulate the carry of firearms on its property should depend on the character of the property at issue, and just as some government property has historically hosted public assembly and debate, some government properties-particularly national parks and remote lands home to dangerous wildlife-have historically accommodated an armed citizenry. Courts therefore should not interpret Heller to stand for the sweeping proposition that the government may act with impunity whenever it bans the carry of firearms on its property. In sum, Part V concludes that courts should subject broad gun bans on university campuses, national parks, and remote public lands to some form of heightened scrutiny, rather than regard them as burdening conduct that is categorically unprotected under the Second Amendment.
II. HELLER, McDONALD, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
OUTSIDE THE HOME This Part describes why Heller and McDonald strongly imply a robust right to armed self-defense that extends outside the home to many public places. A brief review of both decisions is necessary to explain this extension.
A. District of Columbia v. Heller: A Brief Review
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 21 the Supreme Court undertook its first thorough examination of the Second Amendment in modern history. 22 23 The challenge required the Court to decide whether the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms or rather only a collective right tied to militia service. 24 Prior to the Court's decision, the U.S. courts of appeal, in line with the prevailing view among academics, had largely rejected the individual-right interpretation and had embraced the collective-right model. 25 Only the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit (in the decision below) had held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right unconnected to service in a militia. 26 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected the collective right theory and struck down the challenged gun laws as violative of the Second Amendment. The Court held that the Second Amendment secures an individual right to keep and bear arms that does not depend on militia service and that, at its core, the Second Amendment guarantees "the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home." 27 The Court began by dividing the Amendment into its prefatory and operative clauses. 28 In its textual analysis of the operative clause, the Court observed that in every other instance in the Constitution, the phrase "right of the people" referred unambiguously to an individual-not collective-right. 29 Furthermore, the Court observed that the term "the people" "unambiguously refers to all members of the political community," and the Second Amendment right, therefore, "belongs to all Americans," not merely to those who serve in a militia. 30 As to the phrase "keep and bear Arms," the Court noted that "the the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia," and at the time of ratification, those serving in militias were expected to supply themselves with arms "of the kind in common use at the time. 18th-Century meaning [of 'Arms'] is no different from the meaning today," and the Amendment protects modern-day weapons just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communication. 31 The Court then thoroughly examined an array of colonial and founding-era sources indicating that the phrase "keep arms" meant "have weapons," and the phrase "bear arms" meant to carry weapons for either offensive or defensive use. 32 Notably, the Court found that when the Bill of Rights was ratified, both phrases often referred to the possession and carry of weapons outside of an organized militia. 33 Putting the operative clause's textual elements together, the Court determined that the Amendment guarantees "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation," and observed that this interpretation "is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment." 34 The Court again surveyed a litany of seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and early nineteenth-century sources supporting the conclusion that, at the time of its ratification, the public understood the Second Amendment to protect an individual right to bear arms for self-defense. 35 The Court noted, however, that "[o]f course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment's right of free speech was not." 36 Thus, the Court declined to "read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose." 37 Turning to the Second Amendment's prefatory clause, the Court noted that, at the time of the founding, the "militia" consisted of all able-bodied men. 38 The Court rejected the government's argument that the militia identified in the Amendment was the organized militia-a military body created by Congress or the States. 39 Rather, the Court observed, the Second Amendment's prefatory clause addressed the general militia, whose existence pre-dated the Constitution's ratification. 40 The Court found textual support for this interpretation in Article I's grants of power to Congress to "provide for calling forth" and to "organiz[e]" the militia. 41 These grants of power assumed the pre-existence of their object, in contrast to Congress's grants of power to "raise . . . Armies" and "provide . . . a Navy," which were powers to 31 create. 42 As for the adjective "well-regulated," the Court found it to imply "nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and training." 43 The Court then briefly examined the phrase "security of a free State," observing that it was a "term[ ] of art in 18th-Century political discourse, meaning a 'free country' or free polity." 44 A well-regulated militia was thought "necessary to the security of a free state," the Court observed, because it could repel invasions, suppress insurrections, eliminate the need for standing armies, and resist domestic tyranny. 45 Putting the Second Amendment's prefatory and operative clauses together, the Court noted that they complement each other perfectly since the founding generation knew that past tyrants had eliminated militias by disarming the citizenry. 46 The Court observed that during the 1788 ratification debates, Antifederalists feared that a powerful federal government would disarm the people and impose tyrannical rule by a standing army. 47 At the same time, the Court cautioned that just because the founding generation codified the right to bear arms for the main purpose of preventing the elimination of the militia did not mean that the right to bear arms was limited to militia service. 48 Numerous historical sources confirmed that, for the founding generation, self-defense "was the central component of the right itself," even if it was not the main purpose for the right's codification in the Constitution. 49 Having made its case for interpreting the Second Amendment to protect an individual right, the Court turned to founding-era analogues in state constitutions and post-ratification commentary, case law, and legislation. The Court found that these sources overwhelmingly confirmed that the Court's understanding of the Amendment comported with that of the American public at the time of ratification and well into the 19th-Century. 50 Before its analysis of the challenged D.C. gun laws, the Court paused to stress the narrowness of its decision. In a now familiar passage, the Court declared:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. 51 The Court explained that "[w]e identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive." 52 The Court then finally turned its attention to Washington, D.C.'s complete ban on the possession of handguns and operable firearms in the home. The Court noted that "the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right," and the District's handgun ban "amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose." 53 Furthermore, the Court noted that the handgun ban extended to the home, "where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute." 54 Such a sweeping measure would fail " [u] nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights," the Court opined, explicitly ruling out rational basis review. 55 The Court noted that the severity of D.C.'s handgun ban knew almost no historical parallel, and it cited with approval state decisions that had invalidated prohibitions on carrying pistols openly (though leaving intact bans on the concealed carry of pistols). 56 That the ban still allowed the possession of long guns would not cure the constitutional infirmity-Americans consider the handgun to be the "quintessential self-defense weapon," and a complete prohibition of "the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home . . . is invalid." 57 The Court was equally unsympathetic to the District's blanket prohibition against the inhome possession of operable firearms, declaring it unconstitutional because it made it "impossible for citizens to use [firearms] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense." 58 The Court then made several parting observations in response to Justice Breyer's dissent, which had enlisted a compilation of colonialera gunpowder storage and firearms discharge regulations to advance an argument in favor of the constitutionality of the District's handgun ban and which had also criticized the majority for declining to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment claims. The Court noted that Justice Breyer's "fire-safety laws . . . do not remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns." 59 As to Justice Breyer's "broad jurisprudential point," the Court defended its refusal to provide a detailed framework for analyzing future Second Amendment claims and flatly rejected Justice Breyer's proposed "judge-empowering 'interest-balancing inquiry.' " 60 The Court insisted that "[w]e know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding 'interest-balancing' approach," remarking that "[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad." 61 The First Amendment's guarantee was understood by the ratifying public to contain exceptions for obscenity, libel, and espionage but not for the expression of unpopular opinions. 62 "The Second Amendment is no different," the Court concluded, "[a]nd whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home." 63 Finally, responding to Justice Breyer's criticism of the Court for failing to provide "extensive historical justification for those regulations of the right that we describe as permissible," the Court assured that "there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us. 
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago: A Brief Review
Having prevailed against the District of Columbia's draconian firearms laws, gun-rights proponents turned their gaze to the next logical step for Second Amendment litigation: incorporation. They set their sights on Chicago, and they picked their target well.
Over 120 years beforehand, the Supreme Court had refused to incorporate the Second Amendment in Presser v. Illinois, a case which involved a Chicago resident's constitutional challenge to his conviction under an Illinois law that generally prohibited groups of citizens from "drill[ing] or parad[ing] with arms in any city or town of this state" without a license from the governor. 65 The Supreme Court upheld the conviction on the grounds that the Second Amendment applied only to the federal government, citing United States v. Cruikshank 66 as the main support for its decision. 67 Presser and Cruikshank had been decided in the wake of the Slaughter-House Cases and long before the flowering of the Court's modern selective incorporation doctrine, and in their effort to overturn these stale decisions, gun-rights advocates looked to Chicago once again, which had enacted a handgun ban nearly identical to the one that the Court had invalidated in Heller.
Emboldened 71 The end result, however, was clear: Heller's right to keep and bear arms applied fully to state and local governments, and lower courts would now have to begin the arduous task of developing Second Amendment doctrine amidst a flurry of challenges to restrictive gun laws across the country.
The Court in McDonald acknowledged that by the 1850s, the American public-unlike the founding generation-no longer held a widespread fear that the federal government would disarm the general militia. 72 Even so, the Court observed that "the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued for purposes of self-defense." 73 The Court then argued that historical sources overwhelmingly confirm that at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in 1868, the American public deemed the right of armed self-defense to be "fundamental." 74 The Court chronicled the attempted disarmament of Free-Soilers in Bloody Kansas, as well as the systematic disarmament of blacks during the period immediately following the Civil War. 75 The Court then recounted Congress's legislative efforts to curb the violence perpetrated against disarmed southern blacks, beginning with § 14 of the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, which provided that "the right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty [and] personal security . . . including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens . . . without respect to race, or color, or previous condition of slavery." 76 The Court noted that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 similarly sought to protect the right to keep and bear arms and that "it is generally accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to provide a constitutional basis for protecting the rights set out in the Civil Rights Act of 1866." 77 The Court also looked to the debates leading up to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, evidence from the period immediately following ratification, and the overwhelming majority of state constitutions that protected a right to keep and bear arms in 1868. 78 These sources buttressed the Court's conclusion that "the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty." 79 Justice Alito, in a portion of his opinion that commanded the votes of a four-Justice plurality, took pains to re-emphasize Heller's assurance that the right to keep and bear arms knows several limitations:
It is important to keep in mind that Heller, while striking down a law that prohibited the possession of handguns in the home, recognized that the right to keep and bear arms is not "a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose." We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as "prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill," "laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms." We repeat those assurances here. Despite municipal respondents' doomsday proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms. 80 In his separate concurrence, Justice Thomas did not directly address the issue, but neither did he give any reason to doubt his continued support for Heller's dictum. 81 McDonald therefore preserved the Court's position that bans on the carry of firearms in sensitive places are presumptively valid, but it shed no further light on the issue. The decision also followed Heller's lead by declining to establish a standard of review for Second Amendment claims, thereby leaving the task of doing so to lower courts in future challenges.
C. Why Heller and McDonald Strongly Imply a Robust Right to Armed Self-Defense Outside the Home
While both Heller and McDonald confronted highly restrictive laws that applied to the in-home possession of commonly used firearms, they nevertheless strongly imply a robust right to armed self-defense outside the home. Most obviously, Heller acknowledged that the Second Amendment protects two different rights-to "keep" and to "bear" arms-and it specifically interpreted the latter as a right to "carry" weapons. 82 McDonald strongly emphasized the centrality of selfdefense to the Second Amendment right, and the need for self-defense is not-and never has been-confined to the home.
Heller's Early American Commentary and Case Law
As the Seventh Circuit has observed, "[t]o speak of 'bearing' arms within one's home would at all times have been an awkward usage," and "one doesn't have to be a historian to realize that a right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense in the eighteenth century could not rationally have been limited to the home." 83 Indeed, the very historical sources that Heller approvingly cited confirm that the American public understood the Second Amendment to protect a right to armed self-defense outside the home. For example, in discussing the original public meaning of "bear arms," Heller partially relied on Cecil Humphreys's early nineteenth-century observation that " 'in this country the constitution guaranties to all persons the right to bear arms; then it can only be a crime to exercise this right in such a manner, as to terrify people unnecessarily.' " 84 This passage would make little sense if the Second Amendment right were limited to the home; if the right to bear arms did not extend past the home, then its exercise could not possibly run the risk of "terrify[ing] people unnecessarily." The Court's approval of William Rawle's observation in 1825 that the Second Amendment right "ought not 'be abused to the disturbance of the public peace,' such as by assembling with other armed individuals 'for an unlawful purpose,' " 85 further underscores the point. Additionally, to decipher the original meaning of "bear arms," the Heller Court also relied on Justice James Wilson's interpretation ing that the Supreme Court has indicated that the Second Amendment extends beyond the home because "Heller engaged in significant historical analysis on the meaning of the text of the Second Amendment, specifically focusing on the words 'keep' and 'bear' as codifying distinct rights"); Drake, 2013 WL 3927735, at *13 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) ("To speak of 'bearing' arms solely within one's home not only would conflate 'bearing' with 'keeping,' in derogation of the Court's holding that the verbs codified distinct rights, but also would be awkward usage given the meaning assigned the terms by the Supreme Court." This passage explicitly made a distinction between the right to selfdefense in the home and the right to self-defense outside the home, asserting that both were protected. But perhaps most telling is Heller's reliance on two antebellum state court decisions that unequivocally interpreted the Second Amendment to protect a right to bear arms outside the home. 87 In Nunn v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down a near-total prohibition on the carry of firearms in public, holding that the Second Amendment protects a right to openly carry firearms. 88 The Nunn court opined that under the Second Amendment, the state could regulate the manner in which pistols were carried and thus could criminalize the practice of carrying them in concealment, but the state could not completely prohibit the carry of firearms for protection outside the home. 89 
Heller's "Sensitive Places" Passage
In addition to the legal sources upon which Heller relied to decipher the original public meaning of the Second Amendment, Heller's sensitive places passage itself strongly suggests a right to bear arms outside the home. 92 If the right to bear arms does not extend beyond the home, then the Court simply could have said so and would then have had no need to reassure the District of Columbia that it could ban the carry of firearms in sensitive places. That a location's sensitivity has any bearing at all on the constitutional analysis seems to rule out the possibility that the Court meant to confine the Second Amendment to the home. Heller's sensitive places passage strongly implies that in the developing landscape of Second Amendment jurisprudence, prohibitions on the carry of firearms in public should be the exception, not the rule. Any other interpretation of Heller would render unnecessary the specificity with which it reassured the District of Columbia regarding its bans on the carry of firearms in sensitive places.
Heller's and McDonald's Strong Emphasis on Self-Defense
Finally, in both Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court implied that the right to bear arms extends beyond the home by its repeated emphases on the centrality of self-defense to the Second Amendment right. In Heller, the Court recognized that colonial Americans understood the pre-existing, natural "right of self-preservation" to permit a citizen to " 'repe[l] force by force' when 'the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.' " 93 Heller also made clear that this pre-existing right was codified in the Second Amendment. 94 95 observing that commentators such as St. George Tucker-presumably alongside the early American public at-large-equated the right to self-defense with the Second Amendment. 96 In McDonald, the Court repeated these observations, finding that "[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day," and, therefore, the Second Amendment right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 97 Clearly, the need for self-defense is not-and never has been-confined to the home, and both Heller and McDonald implicitly acknowledged this fact. Heller recognized the need for self-defense outside the home when it observed that the District's handgun ban extended "to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute." 98 If the need for self-defense is "most acute" in the home, then presumably there must be some other places outside the home where it is also "acute." 99 self-defense occur only within the home, and for good reason: such a statement would border on the ridiculous. 101 McDonald underscored the need for self-defense outside the home by its extensive discussion of the systematic disarmament of-and subsequent violence against-southern blacks shortly after the Civil War. To provide support for the proposition that the ratifying public understood the Fourteenth Amendment to make the right to keep and bear arms applicable against the states, McDonald alluded to several instances in which disarmed blacks were tortured and killed outside their homes. 102 It would have been a cruel trick for the Fourteenth Amendment to have guaranteed freedmen the right to bear arms only when inside their homes, while corrupt state officials, ex-Confederate soldiers, and Klansmen patrolled the streets outside and waited for them to emerge unarmed. Fortunately, nothing in the Court's opinion in McDonald suggests that was the case, and its extensive discussion of the plight of freedmen during Reconstruction highlights the need for a robust right to armed self-defense outside the home.
III. TERRA INCOGNITA AND EMERGING SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINE IN THE LOWER COURTS
Heller and McDonald answered the fundamental questionswhether the Second Amendment secures an individual right and whether that right is enforceable against the states-but they left to lower courts the arduous task of developing a detailed analytical framework for Second Amendment claims. The Court did not, however, send them out to explore this vast terra incognita without a map or compass. 103 ; id. at 628-29 (striking down the District of Columbia's handgun ban because "the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right. The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of arms that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose. The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 106. See, e.g., id. at 632 (observing that the gunpowder storage laws Justice Breyer cited in his dissent "do not remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns" and asserting that the Court's analysis does not "suggest the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents"). 107. Id. at 628 n.27 ("If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect."). Armed with these tools, the federal courts of appeals have already filled in many of the gaps left by Heller and McDonald and have even reached a widespread consensus on the general framework that courts should follow when analyzing claims founded on the right to keep and bear arms. Even so, courts that apply this general framework disagree on two key issues. First, courts diverge in their treatment of Heller's "presumptively lawful regulatory measures." Second, courts following the majority approach also disagree on whether-and if so, to what extent-the right to bear arms extends beyond the home.
A. Two-Step Analysis: Scope and Scrutiny
The overwhelming majority of federal courts of appeals that have entertained post-Heller Second Amendment claims have adopted a two-step approach for analyzing such claims. 109 According to the majority approach, courts will ask whether the challenged statute imposes a burden on conduct that falls within the Second Amendment's guarantee. If it does not, the statute is constitutional. If the statute does burden conduct that the Second Amendment protects, however, courts will ask whether it passes muster under the appropriate level of heightened review. 110 Just before this issue went to print, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit announced that it would follow the majority two-step approach except when confronted with a complete prohibition of the core right to armed self-defense. When government prohibits nearly all "typical responsible, law-abiding citizen[s]" from exercising the core right to armed self-defense, the Ninth Circuit will decline to apply any form of scrutiny and will simply declare the prohibition invalid per se. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10-56971 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014).
courts will select a level of scrutiny greater than rational basis review-usually something approximating either intermediate or strict scrutiny-based on how close the burdened right comes to the core of the Second Amendment's guarantee and how severely the challenged statute burdens that right. 111 The first federal court of appeals decision to articulate this bifurcated approach was the Seventh Circuit's now-vacated decision in United States v. Skoien. 112 In an opinion by Judge Diane Sykes, a panel of the Seventh Circuit vacated a defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits convicted domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing firearms. The defendant had moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that prosecuting him under § 922(g)(9) violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms for hunting. 113 The government defended the indictment merely by referencing Heller's intention to leave intact "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill." 114 Judge Sykes rejected the government's superficial analogy to Heller's "longstanding prohibitions," observing that Heller's "reference to exceptions cannot be read to relieve the government of its burden of justifying laws that restrict Second Amendment rights." 115 Judge Sykes began her analysis with an examination of Heller. She observed that Heller's reference to exceptions could have been intended to mean that certain gun laws are valid because they burden conduct that "fall[s] outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the time of the framing," or rather because "they are presumptively lawful under even the highest standard of scrutiny applicable to laws that encumber constitutional rights." 116 Without resolving that question directly, Judge Sykes interpreted Heller to "establish[ ] the following general approach" to claims founded on the right to keep and bear arms:
First, some gun laws will be valid because they regulate conduct that falls outside the terms of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was ratified. If the government can establish this, then the analysis need go no further. If, however, a law regulates conduct falling within the scope of the right, then the law will be valid (or not) depending on the government's ability to satisfy whatever level of means-end scrutiny is held to apply; the degree of fit required between the means and the end will depend on how closely the law comes to the core of the right and the severity of the law's burden on the right. . . . If the first inquiry into the founding-era scope of the right doesn't Applying this general approach, Judge Sykes noted that the first inquiry didn't yield a conclusive answer as to whether domestic violence misdemeanants fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee as the founding generation originally understood it. But since the government had not argued the point, Judge Sykes proceeded on the assumption that the defendant's Second Amendment rights were intact. 118 Turning to the second inquiry, Judge Sykes selected intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for the case. She noted that "strict scrutiny cannot apply across the board" to all Second Amendment claims, given "Heller's dicta about 'presumptively lawful' firearms laws." 119 Because the defendant was a convicted domestic violence misdemeanant claiming a right to bear arms only for hunting purposes, Judge Sykes noted that the case presented a claim that was "several steps removed from the core constitutional right identified in Heller," to wit, the right of "law-abiding, responsible citizens" to bear arms for self-defense. 120 Judge Sykes therefore held that intermediate scrutiny provided the correct standard of review, and she remanded the case to the district court, giving the government an opportunity to discharge its burden on a more developed record. 121 Judge Sykes's decision was later vacated when the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en banc, 122 but it nonetheless proved highly influen- tial. Two weeks after the Seventh Circuit vacated Judge Sykes's opinion, the Third Circuit similarly found that Heller "suggests a twopronged approach to Second Amendment challenges." 123 Under the Third Circuit's test, courts must ask "whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee," and if it does, they must then evaluate the law under some form of heightened review. 124 For guidance in selecting the appropriate standard of review, the Third Circuit opined that just as First Amendment claims receive a sliding scale of scrutiny, "depending upon the type of law challenged and the type of speech at issue," the level of review for Second Amendment claims should similarly hinge on the particular iteration of the right asserted and the degree to which the challenged statute burdens that right. 125 This framework ultimately led the Third Circuit to uphold, under an intermediate scrutiny test, the federal ban on the possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers. 126 Judge Sykes's and the Third Circuit's two-prong test, or a substantially similar one, has been adopted by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits. 127 Additionally, just before this issue went to print, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit announced that it will follow the scope-scrutiny approach in most Second Amendment cases, but it will omit the scrutiny step in favor of "Heller-style per se invalidation" when confronted with a complete prohibition of the core right to armed self-defense. 128 The lower federal courts have therefore widely settled on the two-step It should also be noted that Judge Sykes, in a later case, wrote for a panel of the Seventh Circuit and formally adopted the scope-scrutiny two-step approach. 
B. Differing Treatment of Heller's Longstanding, Presumptively Lawful Regulations
While most of the federal circuits have settled on a bifurcated scope-scrutiny framework for dealing with Second Amendment challenges, they disagree on where to place Heller's "presumptively lawful regulatory measures" on that framework. Some circuits treat them as categorical exceptions that either presumptively or conclusively burden conduct that falls completely outside the scope of the Second Amendment's protections. 130 Such courts draw an analogy to categories of speech that receive no First Amendment protection, such as obscenity and incitement, and find it unnecessary to subject Heller's presumptively valid laws to any form of review. Other circuits have instead opted to regard Heller's presumptively valid regulations as burdens on conduct that is protected by the Second Amendment but which presumptively pass muster in a facial attack. 131 This passage plainly refers to a class of arms outside the "protect[ion]" of the Second Amendment's guarantee, and some courts contend that this passage in Heller equates laws prohibiting "dangerous and unusual weapons" with the list of presumptively valid regulations that immediately precedes the passage. 135 On the other hand, courts that adopt the second approach also find support in the language and decision method of Heller. They note that Heller declined to establish a standard of review for Second Amendment claims, opting instead to invalidate the District of Columbia's gun laws on the ground that they would fail any standard of scrutiny. Interpreting Heller's exceptions as laws that pass any standard of scrutiny would give the decision a certain symmetry, they observe. 136 Furthermore, the historical pedigree of Heller's list has never been established, and courts have read Heller's originalist approach to require the application of heightened review if a historical inquiry does not definitively resolve the "scope" portion of the scope-scrutiny analysis. 137 Finally, the Court used the term "presumptively lawful"-not "categorically lawful"-to describe its list of longstanding regulations. Lower courts adopting the second approach have often found this language to indicate that as-applied challenges to Heller's list of regulations may well succeed. 138 tions that fail at step one of the scope-scrutiny analysis and instead will subject them to heightened scrutiny in as-applied challenges. 139
C. Different Approaches to the Right to Armed Self-Defense
Outside the Home
The U.S. Courts of Appeals are also divided on the issue of whether-and if so, to what extent-the Second Amendment protects a right of armed self-defense outside the home. Generally, most circuits have tried to avoid the question. 140 The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, however, have directly stated that the right to armed self-defense extends beyond the home, 141 while the Fourth Circuit has strongly suggested that it will decline to recognize such a right until the Supreme Court provides further guidance on the issue. 142 [t] he plain text of the Second Amendment does not limit the right to bear arms to the home," the court observed. 153 The Second Circuit, therefore, proceeded on the assumption that the right to bear arms extends beyond the home but upheld New York's restrictive licensing standard on the grounds that "New York's restriction . . . has a number of close and longstanding cousins" and passes intermediate scrutiny. 154 Just two weeks after the Second Circuit decided Kachalsky, the Seventh Circuit struck down Illinois's general ban on the carry of loaded firearms in public in Moore v. Madigan. 155 In a 2-1 decision authored by Judge Richard Posner, the court concluded that a robust right to bear arms extends beyond the home and that Illinois could not make the "strong showing" required to justify its near-total prohibition on that right. 156 The court began with the observation that the Supreme Court's historical analyses in Heller and McDonald strongly imply a right of armed self-defense outside the home. 157 Like the Second Circuit, the court further noted that the right to "bear" arms-as distinct from the right to "keep" them-probably did not refer to the home. "To speak of 'bearing' arms within one's home would at all times have been an awkward usage," the court asserted. 158 Additionally, given the perils of life on the early American frontier, the court found that "a right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense in the eighteenth century could not rationally have been limited to the home." 159 Even in modern times, the court continued, one's chances of suffering a violent attack are much greater outside the home, and confining the right of armed self-defense to the home would "create[ ] an arbitrary difference" and "divorce the Second Amendment from the right of self-defense described in Heller and McDonald." 160 In its decision, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Illinois's prohibition was more restrictive than the New York permitting scheme upheld by the Second Circuit in Kachalsky. It nonetheless took issue with Kachalsky's "suggestion that the Second Amendment should have much greater scope inside the home than outside," given that "the interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside the home." 161 The Seventh Circuit also responded to Judge Wilkinson's concerns regarding the propriety of navigating this "vast terra incognita," observing that Heller and McDonald opened it up for exploration and " [t] here is no turning back by the lower federal courts." 162 In the most recent and sweeping federal appeals court decision to squarely address the issue, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held in Peruta v. County of San Diego that the Second Amendment guarantees a robust right to armed self-defense beyond the doorstep. 163 Peruta involved a challenge to San Diego County's restrictive concealed carry issuance policy, which, in combination with California's overall regulatory landscape, effectively prohibited most citizens from carrying firearms outside their homes for protection. 164 carry of firearms without a permit issued by one's city or county. 165 California law allows a county or city to issue a concealed carry permit only upon a showing of "good cause" by the applicant. 166 Interpreting this "good cause" requirement, the County of San Diego refused to issue permits unless applicants demonstrated "circumstances that distinguish [them] from the mainstream"-a concern for "one's personal safety alone" would not suffice. 167 In an opinion authored by Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain, the majority conducted an exhaustive textual and historical analysis to determine the original public meaning of "bear Arms." 168 This analysis led the majority to conclude that "the Second Amendment [requires] that the states permit some form of carry for self-defense outside the home," 169 and this form of carrywhether open or concealed-must be available to the "typical responsible, law-abiding citizen." 170 Because San Diego County effectively prohibited concealed carry for all but a chosen few, and because state law prohibited the only other possible carry method, the majority found that the county's policy "destroy[ed] (rather than merely burden[ed]) a right central to the Second Amendment . . . ." 171 The majority, therefore, held that "Heller-style per se invalidation" was appropriate and struck down the policy without applying any form of scrutiny. 172 Finally, while they have yet to squarely decide whether the Second Amendment has application outside the home, the First, Tenth, and Third Circuits have made significant contributions to the ongoing dialogue among the federal courts of appeals. The First Circuit, in rejecting a challenge to a Massachusetts concealed carry license revocation, stated that the in-home possession of firearms for self-defense constitutes the "core" of the Second Amendment; therefore, any purported right to defensively carry a firearm in public falls outside the core. 173 The court also observed that, specifically as to concealed carry, the Supreme Court has stated that even total prohibitions do not offend the Second Amendment. 174 175 The court was careful, however, to stress the narrowness of its decision. 176 Most recently, the Third Circuit joined the discussion when a divided panel upheld New Jersey's restrictive standard for issuing licenses to carry firearms in public. 177 The majority held that even if the Second Amendment applies outside the home in some form, limiting that right to the extraordinarily small number of citizens who can show an "urgent necessity for self-protection" is constitutional because it is a "longstanding" regulation and, alternatively, would pass intermediate scrutiny. 178 This area of Second Amendment law is still in flux, and the federal courts of appeals continue to hotly debate the right's applicability outside the home. Perhaps that is why, as of the time of this writing, the Supreme Court has not yet granted certiorari in any of these cases, although its eventual intervention is inevitable. 179 As section in obiter dicta that the Second Amendment "is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons")). As of this writing, a petition for certiorari is still pending in Drake, and it appears that whether or not San Diego County seeks en banc review, a petition for certiorari may also be forthcoming in Peruta. The express conflict between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits and the Fourth Circuit (and not to mention Maryland's hightest court), and the tension-to put it mildly-between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits and the Second and Third Circuits, will eventually necessitate the Supreme Court's intervention. See Eugene Volokh, Third Circuit Upholds New Jersey's Highly Restrictive Scheme for Gun Carry Licenses, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 31, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/2013/07/31/third-circuit-upholds-new-jerseys-highly-restrictive-scheme-for-gun-carry-licenses/ (guessing there is a "decent chance" that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in Drake because " [t] here is something of a split between the circuits and state supreme courts that have upheld [restrictive permitting schemes], and the Seventh Circuit").
II.C. describes, however, Heller and McDonald strongly imply a robust right to bear arms for self-defense in public. 180 It therefore appears likely the Court will not keep the Second Amendment on house arrest for much longer. Even so, given that the Supreme Court itself has affirmed the constitutionality of bans on the concealed carry of firearms, 181 recognizing a general right to armed self-defense would by no means cripple the government from regulating the manner in which firearms are carried outside the home. 182 Additionally, even if the Court recognizes a right to armed self-defense in public, lower courts are very likely to disagree on the scope of that right 183 Strikingly, the analogy to categories of unprotected speech underscores the gravity of its use. True, the First Amendment right has its exceptions, but they are limited to those "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which ha [ve] never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." 187 Even nude dancing, the historical protection and societal value of which is debatable, 188 has been found by courts to receive some basic quantum of constitutional protection. 189 It would be unwise for courts to broadly interpret Heller's sensitive places while equating them with categorical First Amendment exceptions, giving absolutely no protection to the core of the Second Amendment where citizens most often need it: outside the home. 190 Courts that treat Heller's sensitive places as categorical Second Amendment exceptions therefore have great reason to narrowly confine them.
Additionally, a critical difference between the right to free speech and the right to armed self-defense highlights a special danger of riddling See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 649 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (warning against imprecise analogies to categorical First Amendment exceptions in the Second Amendment context). 188. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 573 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that the challenged ban on completely nude dancing "is in the line of a long tradition of laws against public nudity, which have never been thought to run afoul of traditional understanding of 'the freedom of speech' "). 189. See, e.g., id. at 566 (plurality opinion) (observing that totally nude dancing "is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so"); id. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that totally nude dancing receives some First Amendment protection); id. at 587 (White, J., dissenting) (same passes through a restricted location in the First Amendment context, he regains the ability to speak freely immediately upon exiting the location. 191 Not so with the right to bear arms. To avail oneself of his right to armed self-defense after passing through a restricted location, one has to first retrieve his firearm, which he likely will have stored off-site. Unlike with First Amendment rights, increasing the number of restricted locations has the potential to chill the exercise of Second Amendment rights. Having to pass through several restricted locations in a day will dissuade a person from exercising his right to armed self-defense in other locations due to the burden of continually storing and retrieving his means of defense. This problem generally does not arise with First Amendment rights because the ability to speak follows a person wherever he goes. In short, regarding Heller's sensitive places as categorical Second Amendment exceptions while at the same time adopting an expansive interpretation of them would run a serious risk of undermining the very value that the Second Amendment most strongly protects. As the next Part demonstrates, lessons from other areas of First Amendment law counsel in favor of a restrained interpretation of even Heller's enumerated sensitive places-schools and government buildings. A speaker may therefore have to refrain from communicating his message in a limited or nonpublic forum if that message would violate the forum's "lawful boundaries," but he regains his freedom to speak his mind as soon as he exits the restricted location. At a public university's town hall meeting with a politician, for instance, the university may prohibit attendees from speaking out of turn or shouting epithets at the guest, but an attendee wishing to voice his criticism of the guest or shout out of turn regains the freedom to do so as soon as he steps outside. Cf., e.g., University of Florida Student Tasered at Kerry Forum, YOU-TUBE (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bVa6jn4rpE (depicting a public university student's controversial-but arguably lawful-arrest for refusing to comply with a town hall meeting's rules). 194 This Article follows in their footsteps.
V. HOW FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES SUGGEST
A. "Schools"-Student-Speech Jurisprudence and the Secondary-Post-Secondary Distinction
Heller listed schools as an example of a sensitive place where flat gun bans will presumably pass muster. Setting aside the unique issues raised by laws that prohibit guns in public university campus housing, 195 in public university classrooms, 196 and in private colleges that object to the carry of firearms on their property, 197 what should lower courts do with untailored general prohibitions on the carry of firearms on college campuses? Heller did not specify whether its schools category should encompass post-secondary educational institutions, 198 but broad lessons from student-speech jurisprudence suggest that colleges and universities are less sensitive than primary and secondary schools. Courts, and especially those that interpret Heller to establish categorical Second Amendment exceptions, should therefore interpret Heller's "schools" to encompass only primary and secondary educational institutions.
As a starting point, the Supreme Court has made clear that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 199 The Court has relied on this proposition to protect students' Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 200 It would be inconsistent with these precedents to hold that the Second Amendment offers no protection at all for lawabiding, adult students at public universities who-unlike primary and secondary school students-fall within the Second Amendment's guarantee. 201 College students do not forfeit their consti- tutional rights simply because they step onto a public university campus. 202 At the same time, the Supreme Court has also recognized that the First Amendment's protections do not sweep as widely for students in a classroom as they do for adults. 203 For example, high schools may punish even silent, passive expressions of opinion that "materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school" or "involve[ ] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." 204 They may also prohibit "vulgar and lewd speech" that would "undermine the school's basic educational mission." 205 The Court has similarly allowed a high school to punish students for displaying a sign at a school event that could be "reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use." 206 And in what many commentators have lamented as the Court's most restrictive interpretation of students' free speech rights, the Court held in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier that high schools may "exercis[e] editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 207 Interestingly, each of these decisions limiting student speech rights took place in the high school context, 208 and the Supreme Court placed a strong emphasis on the youth and immaturity of the speakers (and listeners). In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court upheld a high school's suspension of a student for his delivery of a vulgar student government campaign speech, emphasizing that the First Amendment does not permit "children in a public school" as much latitude as "adults in other settings." 209 The Court called the student who delivered the offensive remarks a "confused boy," noting that his sexually explicit language "could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality." 210 In Hazelwood, the Court upheld a high school principal's decision to censor portions of a school newspaper issue that described students' experiences with pregnancy and parental divorce. The Court reasoned that schools "must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might range from the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to . . . teenage sexual activity in a high school setting." 211 In Morse v. Frederick, the Court upheld a high school principal's suspension of students who, at a school event, unfurled a banner that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS." 212 In its opinion, the Court called the students "schoolchildren" and emphasized the effects of illicit drug use among "young people," declaring that schools have an "important-indeed, perhaps compelling interest" in deterring youth from illegal drug use. 213 These dicta suggest as a general proposition that older and more mature college students might enjoy broader constitutional rights than their primary and secondary school counterparts, and that colleges and universities are less sensitive than elementary, middle, and high schools. 214 The Supreme Court has even suggested in other contexts that the First Amendment distinction between secondary and post-secondary students may be one of kind and not simply degree. 215 Coincidentally, in Hazelwood, the Court expressly recognized the possibility that students' free speech rights might admit a secon-dary-post-secondary distinction, although it declined to decide the question. 216 Facing this lack of clear guidance, lower courts have divided over whether Hazelwood's extremely deferential standard should apply in the university setting, 217 but even those courts that do apply it to post-secondary curricular student speech have recognized that what counts as reasonable editorial control may vary from the high school context to the college context. 218 These cases add further support to the notion that colleges and universities are generally less sensitive than primary and secondary schools.
Given these lessons from student-speech jurisprudence, lower courts that interpret Heller to establish categorical Second Amendment exceptions should narrowly interpret Heller's "schools" and subject general gun bans on public college and university campuses to some form of heightened review, rather than uphold them at step one of the scope-scrutiny analysis. The Supreme Court has made clear that students do not give up their constitutional rights simply because they find themselves on a college campus, and courts have often suggested that the secondary-post-secondary distinction matters in the First Amendment context. It should matter in the Second Amendment context, as well.
B. "Government Buildings"-First Amendment Forum Doctrine and the Government as Property Owner
The Fifth Circuit has recognized in an unpublished opinion that the government generally has much broader authority to regulate the carry of firearms on its own property than it does in other locations. 219 No serious scholar would disagree. 220 The sticking point for courts in post-Heller challenges will be defining the precise contours of the government's authority to prohibit the defensive possession of firearms on its property, given the ambiguity of Heller's "government buildings" phrase. Courts might interpret Heller's government buildings phrase to stand for the proposition that the government enjoys unlimited authority in this area and that it may ban firearms whenever it acts as property owner. Or courts might instead narrowly interpret Heller's dictum to mean that the government enjoys broad authority to ban firearms only in actual buildings where sensitive government business takes place. This latter interpretation would draw a distinction between such buildings and other types of public property.
The interaction between the general public's 221 individual liberties and the government's authority as property owner is nothing new to constitutional law. First Amendment forum doctrine in particular comes to mind. Modern forum doctrine is premised on the notion that the scope of the government's authority to limit the exercise of individual liberties on its property hinges on "the character of the property at issue." 222 The Supreme Court has developed a fairly comprehensive sliding-scale approach to handling First Amendment claims on government property, wherein the strength of such claims depends almost entirely on whether the subject property is classified as a traditional public forum, designated (or "limited") public forum, or nonpublic forum. 223 Certainly then, a one-size-fits-all approach to Second Amendment claims on government property would fail to harmonize with this most basic theme of First Amendment law. Even the broadest analogy to public-forum doctrine, therefore, counsels strongly against an interpretation of Heller that would give the government unfettered power to prohibit firearms on its property in all circumstances. 224 220. See Volokh, supra note 117, at 1473 (2009) (describing how the government's authority to restrict individual liberties generally expands when it acts as proprietor). 221. This Article focuses on the relationship between the government as property owner and the general public to demonstrate the need for a restrained interpretation of Heller's "government buildings" passage. It does not address, for example, the special relationship between the government and public housing tenants or the government and its employees. S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) (using the terms "traditional public forums," "designated public forums," and "limited public forums"). 224. Cf. Volokh, supra note 117, at 1533 ("Courts need to work out a government-asproprietor doctrine for the right to bear arms much as they have done for the freedom of speech.").
Another basic theme of First Amendment forum doctrine-the public's ability to acquire a right by longstanding historical use-suggests that citizens' Second Amendment rights should receive heightened protection on at least some types of government property. In the First Amendment context, the government's authority to regulate speech in "traditional public forums" such as parks, streets, and sidewalks, is narrowly circumscribed. 225 The heightened protection of free speech in those locations owes to the fact that "they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." 226 Commentators have described this special protection of free speech as a prescriptive easement-type right by which longstanding public use of government property justifies curtailment of the government's authority as property owner. 227 This broad theme of First Amendment forum doctrine bears obvious application at the very least to national parks, which have "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind," have accommodated the right to bear arms. American citizens have historically enjoyed the freedom to carry firearms in national parks for protection against dangerous wildlife, and severe restrictions on that freedom did not come about until 1984. 228 As one small but enlightening illustration, the father of America's national parks This historic right to the defensive carry of firearms might also be said to extend to undeveloped government property in general, and especially any remote locations that provide habitats for large predators. In Heller, the Supreme Court suggested that the right to armed self-defense extends especially to those places where the need for protection is "acute." 233 The United States is home to a variety of large predators such as grizzly bears, cougars, and wolves, and the need for self-defense is certainly "acute" in the areas that these animals call home. 234 Courts should regard such land-and any other public property where a broad right to carry firearms may historically have been permitted 235 -as a sort of "traditional public forum" in the Second Amendment context. At the very least, courts should not read Heller's "government buildings" to encompass all government-owned property, and they should subject bans on the defensive carry of firearms in national parks and remote public lands to some form of heightened scrutiny.
Finally, one more important theme permeates First Amendment forum doctrine that may prove instructive in the Second Amendment context. In all types of government property-even nonpublic forums, where the government's ownership power is at its height and citizens' right to free speech is at its low watermark-the government lacks the power to tread on the First Amendment's most sacred protection: the guarantee against viewpoint discrimination. 236 Although perhaps somewhat of a stretch beyond Heller's and McDonald's core right of "self"-defense, courts might find that the Second Amendment contains a similar basic guarantee, such as a guarantee that the government may only disarm law-abiding, adult members of the general public on its property if it makes reasonable provision for their safety. Courts examining flat prohibitions on the defensive carry of firearms on government-owned property might therefore subject them to meaningful review if the government does not conduct sensitive business in those locations and has no armed security or metal detectors to assure the visiting public's safety.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the right secured by the Second Amendment, like others secured by the Bill of Rights, is not unlimited, a broad view of Heller's sensitive places exception has the potential to swallow Heller's strong self-defense rule. As lower courts have begun to develop Second Amendment doctrine in the wake of Heller and McDonald, many have looked to the First Amendment and have analogized Heller's presumptively valid laws to regulations on categories of speech that receive no constitutional protection, such as obscenity and incitement. This analogy is appealing, but it also illustrates why courts should not take a broad view of Heller's dictum. In the First Amendment context, categories of speech that receive no constitutional protection have been kept to a very small number, with strict definitions to avoid infringements on even marginally protected speech. In the same way, the vast majority of Second Amendment claims should receive some type of scrutiny or the right will mean little. Courts that interpret Heller's presumptively constitutional regulations as categorical Second Amendment exceptions should therefore narrowly confine them to their historical roots to prevent the Second Amendment from falling back into its pre-Heller oblivion. As this Article has shown, lessons from First Amendment forum doctrine and student-speech jurisprudence in particular caution against a broad reading of even Heller's enumerated sensitive places-schools and government buildings. This is not to say that laws banning the carry of firearms on college campuses, national parks, and remote public lands are necessarily unconstitutional. Rather, this Article has advanced the more narrow argument that law-abiding litigants who challenge such laws should at 236. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) ("Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.") (emphasis added).
the very least be entitled to their day in court, and the government should bear the burden to prove the ban's constitutionality under some form of heightened review. In the First Amendment context, courts have narrowly confined categories of speech that receive no constitutional protection to preserve the broad scope of the guarantee, but they have also recognized that constitutional protection and governmental regulation are not mutually exclusive. So should it be with the Second Amendment.
